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COMMENT/Government Contracts-An Analysis of
Liquidated Damages, Default and
Impossibility of Performance
I. INTRODUCTION
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to examine two areas in the field of government
contracts which may severely affect the government contractor. These areas
are: the conditions and circumstances upon which liquidated damages can
be assessed against the contractor and the conditions and circumstances
upon which his contract is terminated for default. In this examination, stress
will be placed upon a common defense that may be available to the con-
tractor in seeking to avoid the imposition of these harsh government rem-
edies-impossibility of performance.
Generally, government contracts comprise a volume and complexity of
forms, clauses and variations of contracts. Such contracts satisfy the govern-
ment's practical needs as well as the promotion of many social and economic
policies. These contracts may be classified into the following general cate-
gories: research and development, construction, architectural-engineering,
and supply of goods and services. Various modes of compensation arrange-
ments are employed: i.e., fixed price, cost reimbursement, and variations of
both, including sophisticated formulas for incentive payments.
Since World War II, government contracting has expanded to become a
significant factor within the Gross National Product. Federal purchases of
goods and services were estimated to be 74.4 billion dollars in 1967.1 This
figure applies mainly to national defense which includes the procurement of
weapons systems, facilities, supplies and services. Because of this tremendous
impact on the economy and the overwhelming differences in relative bar-
gaining power, the government contractor stands in growing need of clarifi-
cation and redefinition of the laws and procedures applicable to him. This
requirement of uniformity is basic to the prevention of unjust and arbitrary
government action.
The procedures, regulations, and rules concerning the administration and
interpretation of government contracts amount to a labyrinth of detail. The
unwary may be subjected to severe penalties through ignorance or mistake
concerning these government regulations which have been given the binding
force of law.2
1 BuRrAu OF THE BUDGET, THE BUDGET IN BRIEF-FISCAL YEAR 1967, 15.
'Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
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In 1875, the Supreme Court stated that if the federal government "comes
down from its position of sovereignty and enters the domain of commerce, it
submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there." That statement,
however, is no longer true either technically or substantively.
The compelling fact is that, to quote Dean Pound, "the bigness of every-
thing" has left its indelible mark on this subject as well as on virtually every-
thing else. Within the last twenty-five years, with the demands or threats of war
on the one hand and the strides of science on the other, the federal government
has emerged as the principal buyer, as well as a principal seller, of goods and
services; as the principal owner and occupier of land; as one of the principal
sources of credit; and, all in all, as the most important single business factor in
the entire national economy. And this transition in function of the United States
Government has had a corresponding impact on the law applicable to dealings
with the Government, with the result that there has now arisen and clearly ex-
ists a special body of legal principles with a distinct personality of its
own which, in many circles at least, is called "government contract law."
It is relatively new, however, and it is still not sufficiently well understood by
contractors or the Bar. Indeed, it is common knowledge in certain government
circles, at least, that many contractors make silly but costly mistakes because of
ignorance of the applicable rules. These mistakes are not in the interest of the
Government or the taxpayer any more than they are in the interest of the con-
tractor himself. They constitute sheer waste.3
Indeed, this body of law has not been a liberal one. The government con-
tract is not the result of mutual bargaining, but rather it is a contract of
adhesion containing exculpatory clauses that attempt to free the govern-
ment from liability.4 These transactions have come to be contracts by regula-
tion since the courts have held the contractor bound to mandatory clauses
although they are omitted from the contract. 5 "[T]he government enjoys
the unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine with whom
it will deal, and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make
needed purchases."0 By the application of this body of law, contractors have
been held liable for small technicalities and omissions which, in the ab-
sence of the sovereign as a party, would not be resolved against the contractor.
The doctrine that men must turn "square corners" 7 when they deal with the
government has caused much concern.8 The fetish of competition and the
strict accountability principle of the Comptroller General have eroded much
of the general contract law.
8 U.S. NAVY DEPT. (OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL), PREFACE TO NAVY CONTRACT LAw (2d
ed. 1959).
American Sanitary Rag Co. v. United States, 142 Ct. Cl. 293, 161 F. Supp. 414 (1958);
Decs. Comp. Gen., B-155678, March 19, 1965.
G.L. Christain & Associates v. United States, 160 Ct. CI. 1, 312 F.2d 418 (1963).
6 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
7 Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
s Leathem, Defense Procurement-A Complex of Conflicts and Tensions, 5 B. C. IND. &
COM. L. REV. 1 (1963).
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURES
Disputes involving the assessment of liquidated damages and termination
of the contract for default that do not rest upon contract interpretation are
questions of fact.9 When such a question arises from performance of the con-
tract, it is resolved by unilateral arbitration. This is facilitated by a proce-
dure recited in the contract clause entitled "Disputes."' 10
The contractor must submit his claim in writing to the contracting officer,
an official of the government who is arbiter and in many instances may have
been an actual party to the contract. The contracting officer is required to
investigate the facts upon which the dispute is based. At this stage, many dis-
putes are settled informally since the expense and delay of further adjudica-
tion benefits neither party. However, in the absence of a settlement, the con-
tracting officer will issue a written decision entitled "findings of fact."" In
reaching this decision, the government holds the contracting officer to a
standard of impartiality.' 2 Upon receipt of the "findings of fact," the con-
tractor has thirty days in which to appeal13 to the Secretary of the executive
agency, otherwise the decision becomes final and conclusive. 14 The Secre-
tary may refer the appeal to a standing board of contract appeal or, in the
case of small agencies, hear the appeal himself.
The larger agencies such as the Department of Defense, the General Serv-
ices Administration, the Interior Department and the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, have set up formal boards to conduct evidentiary hearings on these
appeals. The resulting decisions are final and conclusive on questions of fact
and have been recently held to preclude a trial de novo in the courts. 15 The
leading board, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeal (ASBCA), was
created in 1949 to hear these factual disputes for the tri-service military es-
tablishment.16 The ASBCA has jurisdiction on questions of fact arising from
the contract. 17 The board cannot reform contracts' 8 or settle unliquidated
claims. 19 These are matters reserved for the courts and the Comptroller Gen-
eral.20 However, many of these disputes are mixed questions of law and fact
OStein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 162 Ct. C1. 802, 337 F.2d 861 (1963); Climatic
Rainwear Co. v. United States, 115 Ct. Cl. 520, 88 F.Supp. 415 (1950).
1 0
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-103.12 (1966).
a Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 603 (1936).
Penner Install. Corp. v. United States, 116 Ct. Cl. 550, 89 F. Supp. 545 (1951).
Brooks -Calloway Co. v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 689 (1942), rev'd on other grounds, 318
U.S. 120 (1943).
'4 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-103-12 (1966).
'nWunderlich Act, 68 Stat. 81 (1954), 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1964); United States v. Utah
Constr. & Mining Co., 383 U.S. 394 (1966).
10ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-103-12 (1966).
17 United States v. Grace & Sons, 383 U.S. 424 (1966).
" Mitre Corp., ASBCA Nos. 10021, 10232 & 10233, 66-2 BCA 6052 (1966).
19 Climatic Rainwear Co. v. United States, supra note 9.
-'Schmoll v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 415, 63 F. Supp. 753 (1946).
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in which the ASBCA has been held to have the conclusive power of adjudi-
cation.2' These evidentiary hearings possess many of the procedural safe-
guards and requirements of a full-fledged judicial hearing. Witnesses are
called, cross examination is available, attorneys are certified, rules of evi-
dence are applicable, a transcript of the record is made available, and the
board issues a decision of record.22
Once a decision is issued by ASBCA, the contractor may appeal to a Fed-
eral District Court or the Court of Claims on a question of law under the
jurisdiction given the courts by the Tucker Act.23 The contractor may apply
for relief to the Comptroller General who has authority to settle claims
against the United States.24 However, the Comptroller General does not grant
a hearing; rather he accepts a written appeal and reviews the administrative
record, then issues his decision. The Comptroller General considers himself
bound by only the decisions of the Supreme Court.25 He considers his rulings
prospective as well as adjudicative and therefore binding on the contracting
officer's future actions despite contrary court decisions. 26 But these decisions
do not preclude the contractor from appeal to the courts, who in turn do not
consider themselves bound by Comptroller General rulings.
2 7
An extraordinary relief available to contractors when all these remedies
are exhausted is an application to Congress for referral to the Court of
Claims for an advisory adjudication.28 This procedure is rarely used, how-
ever.
III. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES AND DEFAULT
A. General Applications
Liquidated damages are utilized when time of performance is such an im-
portant factor, that the government may reasonably expect to suffer damages
if performance is delinquent and, that the extent and amount of such
damages would be difficult or impossible to ascertain or prove.2 9 Therefore,
liquidated damages should only be included in the contract when, at the
time of drafting, there is a reasonable anticipation that damages will be suf-
mASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 30.1, App. A-Pt. 1, ASBCA Charter § 5 (1966); United States v.
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., supra note 15.
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 30.1, App. A-Pt. 2, ASBCA Rules § 1-31 (1966).
228 U.S.C. 1346 (a) (2) (1964); (contractor must exhaust his administrative remedies
before application to the courts). United States v. J.A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234 (1940).
Budget & Accounting Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 20, 31 U.S.C. 1 (1964); (contractor must ex-
haust his administrative remedies before applying to Comptroller General). Decs. Comp
Gen., B-156640, May 20, 1965.
133 Decs. Comp. Gen. 66 (1953).
44 Decs. Comp. Gen. 353 (1964).
2 B-W Constr. Co. v. United States, 97 Ct. CI. 92 (1942).
828 U.S.C. 1492 (1964).
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 1-310 (a) (1966).
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fered. The liquidation rate should be fixed in reasonable relation to the
probable actual damages.30 Though later events may demonstrate minimum
actual damage, the liquidated damages have been sustained if the aforemen-
tioned principles were considered.8 1 While liquidated damage clauses8 2 have
been judicially sustained, 3 an arbitrary inclusion will render the provision a
penalty and, therefore, void under the law.8 4 Assessment of liquidated
damages requires a "findings of fact" by the contracting officer which is ap-
pealable under the disputes clause.8 5 Once assessed, the harsh rule concern-
ing liquidated damages only allows remission of the damages at the discre-
tion of the Comptroller General, upon submission of evidence indicating
strong and persuasive equities.8 6 It is usually not granted if the contractor
has an adequate remedy at law.8 7 Furthermore, any monies withheld from
the contractor by the government for liquidated damages do not accrue in-
terest even though the contractor is successful in subsequent claims. 8s The
contracting officer has no jurisdiction to remit the damages once assessed
since the damages are considered a vested property interest of the govern-
ment.39 The contractors only relief outside of the Comptroller General is to
secure a time extension before assessment of damages.40 A grant of time ex-
tension by the contracting officer is binding unless it is fraudulent, capri-
cious, arbitrary, so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith, or not supported
by substantial evidence.
41
Termination of a contract for default of contract action is administered by
a specific contract provision 42 which results in a decision on questions of fact
that can be adjudicated under the disputes clause. Liquidated damages pro-
vide an additional remedy to the government for untimely performance,
and this remedy has been used as an option with the default clause.4 A con-
-ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 1-310(b) (1966).
81 Southwest Engineering Co. v. United States, 10 C.C.F. 72, 937, 341 F.2d 998, (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 819 (1965).
8 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-105.5 (1966).
8 Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907).
3, Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224 (1929).
"Climatic Rainwear Co., v. United States, supra note 9.
Decs. Comp. Gen., B-156765 (1965).
87Decs. Comp. Gen., B-98794 (1950).
"Ramsey v. United States, 121 Ct. Cl. 426, 101 F. Supp. 353 (1951); 17 Decs. Comp. Gen.
526 (1937).
80 Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 28 (1894).
However, under recent legislation, P.L. 89-508, 80 Stat. 308 (1966), the Congress has granted
the contracting officer authority to settle liquidated damage claims under $20,000.
,0 United States v. Foley Co., 379 U.S. 64 (1946); the contractor must request a time ex-
tension, 18 Decs. Comp. Gen. 232 (1938).
U B-W Constr. Co. v. United States, supra note 27.
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 8-707 (1966). The clause applicable to fixed price supply contracts
is cited for convenience. However, clauses applicable to other contract variations are located
in other parts of section 8.
' ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-105.5 (1966).
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tractor can be held liable for both the "excess costs" provision of the default
clause and liquidated damages for untimely performance. 44
A contractor can be subjected to termination for default (1) if he fails
to perform in a timely and adequate manner, or (2) if he fails to fulfill any
other terms and conditions required by the contract. In the first instance, the
contracting officer can unilaterally and without notice terminate the con-
tract. Other violations of contract provisions require the contracting officer
to issue a ten-day notice or "cure" letter to the contractor requiring him to
remedy the violation within that period or default termination will be in-
voked. However, if the time period is not specified, the contractor has a
reasonable time within which he must remedy the violation.
When default violations arise, the contracting officer is faced with certain
considerations of surrounding circumstances. The Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulation (ASPR) suggests that areas of consideration should in-
clude: availability of supplies or services from other sources, urgency of the
project, time factors involved in substituted performance, contractor's capa-
bility and past performance record, effect of default on the contractor, the
contractor's financial arrangement with the government, and an analysis of
the failures and excuses relating to the default. 4 An improper termination
for default was first held by the courts to be converted to termination for
convenience46-relief that does not subject the contractor to excess costs or
debarment. Such a termination for convenience also constitutes a waiver of
liquidated damages and only allows the government to collect actual damages
if the government sustains the burden of proof.47 The substitution of term-
ination for convenience for improper default is now part of ASPR.48
The default provisions create liability to the contractor for "excess costs"
involved in reprocurement by the government. 49 Although in both excess
cost and liquidated damages the government is bound to mitigate the
damages by expeditious administration of the contract.50
The notice of termination for default must be proper and adequate. It
must be in writing and contain (1) identification of the contract by number
and date; (2) a description of the contractor's violation; (3) a statement on
the nature of the portion terminated; (4) a statement that the government
may have the contract completed by another party with the contractor liable
44 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-105.5 (1966); A.C. Rondenelli, an Individual, ASBCA Nos. 9838,
10405, 11310, 11400, 11401 and 11443, 66-1 BCA 5612 (1966); 31 Decs. Comp. Gen. 428
(1952).
"ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 8-602.3 (1966).
Klien v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 8, 285 F.2d 778 (1961).
", United States v. Cunningham, 125 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1941); 29 Decs. Comp. Gen. 36
(1949).
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 8-707 (e) (1966).
41 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 8-707 (b) (1966).
60ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 1-310 (c) (1966); Decs. Comp. Gen., B-150973, (1963).
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for any excess costs; (5) reservation by the government of all rights and
remedies provided by law or under the contract; (6) a statement that the
notice constitutes a decision by the contracting officer that the contractor is
in default and delays are not excusable; and (7) a statement that the con-
tractor has the right to appeal pursuant to the disputes clause.5' The ASBCA
has strictly applied these requirements against the government and has held
the default improper because of government failure to specify the particular
defects of the contractor.52 However, the courts have not held the govern-
ment to precise definitions of the contractor's failure. 53
The contractor can be relieved of default if the government waives the
performance time.54 If the contracting officer fails to issue a timely default
notice upon delinquent performance, the contractor is entitled to a re-estab-
lished reasonable performance time.55 If the parties are conducting busi-
ness with normal relations and delivery is late, default is held to be inap-
plicable.56 However, some courts have held that acceptance of late delivery
standing alone is not enough to constitute waiver. 57 These courts hold that
there can be no implied waiver, but that there must be a clear unequivocal
action by the government to waive its rights.5s They hold that waiver must
be voluntary and consideration must be present in relinquishment of the
right. This position has been modified somewhat by the election theory, which
holds that the government does not give up a right, but rather elects to con-
tinue performance in order to avoid litigation incumbent with default.59 If
the government has re-established a new performance schedule, the contract
can be terminated for default if the contractor fails to perform within the
new schedule. 60 In addition, if a contractor who was in default accepts a new
performance time, he cannot subsequently assert that the time was unrea-
sonable.0 '
It has been suggested that default is not an efficacious remedy because
the original contractor can perform more expeditiously and effectively than
a substituted contractor despite the difficulties leading to his potential de-
fault.62 Termination results in administrative delay and possible government
liability for an improper default.
-' ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 1-310 (c) (1966); 29 Decs. Comp. Gen. 57 (1949).
5 Valley Contractors, ASBCA No. 9397, 1964 BCA 4071 (1964).
5 'American Marine Upholstery Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 564, 345 F.2d 577 (1965).
5, General Elec. Co., ASBCA Nos. 2094 & 2952, 58-1 BCA 1700 (1958).5' Associate-Aircraft-Tool & Mfg. Co. v. United States, ASBCA No. 7255, 1963 BCA 3739
(1963).
" C.T.M. Co., ASBCA No. 7332, 65-1 BCA 4757 (1965).
51 United States v. Chichester, 312 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1963).
51 General Equip. Co., ASBCA No. 6415, 64-1 BCA 4307 (1964).
Cuneo, Waiver of the Due Date in Government Contracts, 43 VA. L. Rxv. 1 (1957).
°T.E. Zoda v. United States, 148 Ct. CI. 49, 180 F. Supp. 419 (1960).
Appeal of Midwest Engin'r & Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 5801, 1962 BCA 3289 (1962).
Leathem supra note 8.
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If the contractor has cause for recission of the default notice or excusable
delays which would mitigate the assessment of liquidated damages, he should
file such claims in writing with the contracting officer. Failure to appeal will
bar subsequent claims even if an excusable delay is merited.63 While the com-
mon law rule held excusable delays to acts of God,64 the standards now ap-
plied to some extent are substantial equities in favor of the contractor. How-
ever, negligence by the contractor will preclude this claim.65
B. Excusable Delay and Nonperformance
The contractor may be excused from liability if he can establish that delay
or nonperformance was beyond his control and without his fault or negli-
gence.6 6 However, there have been uncertainties in the application of the
concept of excusability in relation to the exculpatory language of the default
clause, particularly in three areas: acts of the government; acts of God; and
impossibility of performance.
1. Governmental Acts
These acts include those of a sovereign and those of a contractor. These acts
have been recognized as an excuse by the exculpatory language of the de-
fault clause. But the doctrine of defense of sovereign acts has held the gov-
ernment not liable for acts in its sovereign capacity. In 1925, in Horowitz v.
United States, the Supreme Court announced this doctrine, holding the gov-
ernment free from liability. "Though their sovereign acts performed for the
general good may work injury to some private contractors, such parties gain
nothing by having the United States as their defendants.1
6 7
Therefore, under this doctrine, a contractor terminated for default could
not raise prejudicial acts of the government as a defense. However, the sov-
ereign acts must be public and general without being applied directly upon
an individual contractor.68 There has been confusion over the application
of the doctrine and the courts have refused to apply it in many situations.69
The acts of the government as a contractor include all the express and
implied conditions by which the government is under obligation.70 This in-
cludes a duty to provide in a timely manner the personnel financing and
materials that have been promised to the contractor in the accomplishment
03 Decs. Comp. Gen., B-160639 (1967).
01 Carnegie Steel Co. v. United States, 240 U.S. 156 (1916).
1132 Decs. Comp. Gen. 67 (1952).
OBASPR, 32 C.F.R. 8-707 (c) (1966); United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., supra
note 15.
67267 U.S. 458 (1925).
Speidel, Implied Duties of Cooperation and the Defense of Sovereign Act in Government
Contracts, 51 GEo. L.J. 516 (1963).
,*United States v. Lennox Metal Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1955); Miller v. United
States, 135 Ct. Cl. 1, 140 F. Supp. 789 (1956).
70 Speidel, supra note 68.
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of his task.7' This duty also includes the requirement to furnish reasonable
specifications that are not defective or inadequate. 72 "If faulty specifications
prevent or delay completion of the contract, the contractor is entitled to re-
cover damages for the defendant's breach of its implied warranty." 73
However, the contractor is under an obligation to proceed with the work
under the specifications. If the contractor does not perform, a default notice
can be issued unless the contracting officer's interpretation is erroneous and
places the contractor under the doctrine of impossibility of performance. 74
Any delay of government-furnished equipment or property will also result
in a corresponding time extension.
2. Acts of God
The exculpatory language of the default clause provides an excuse for causes
beyond the control of the contractor which include such incidents as acts of
God or the public enemy, severe weather conditions, strikes, fires, floods,
epidemics, quarantine restriction, and freight embargoes. 75 Severe weather
conditions have been held by the ASBCA to be limited to conditions that
are unusual to the specific geographic area in which the contract is performed.
For example, a monsoon in Thailand will not excuse the contractor who
had access to weather records or knowledge of the area. Strikes and labor
difficulties are governed by the test of foreseeability and the contractors
availability to alternative sources.76 If other sources were available, the con-
tractor is not excused. 77 Where the contractor has lost the services of a key
man whose performance formed an integral part of the project, the contrac-
tor may be excused if he has satisfied the test of foreseeability and has exer-
cised reasonable efforts to secure alternative labor. 7' A presumption is placed
on the contractor that he brings adequate capability, knowledge, experience,
financial resources, facilities and personnel into performance of the con-
tract.79 Reasonable foreseeability and negligence in the loss of these elements
will bar any excuse.
3. Impossibility of Performance
This is a common law defense that has had growing application in the field
of government contracts. Impossibility can be absolute where no one could
perform a specified task regardless of the amount of resources applied.s 0 This
Appeal of Woodside Screw Mach. Co., ASBCA No. 6936, 1962 BCA 3308 (1962).
72 Appeal of Union Elec. & Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 3811, 58-2 BCA 1966 (1958).
Larurnum Constr. Corp. v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 339, 325 F.2d 451 (1963).
71 Natus Corp. v. United States, 11 C.C.F. 80,882, - Ct. Cl. -, 371 F.2d 450 (1967).
75 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 8-707 (c) (1966).
7122 Decs. Comp. Gen. 937 (1943).
7 New England Tank Cleaning Co., ASBCA No. 10208, 66-1 5654 (1966).
" United States Cas. Co. v. United States, 197 Ct. Cl. 46, 67 F. Supp. 750 (1946).
7918 Decs. Comp. Gen. 114 (1938).
81 Appeal of Seaview Elec. Co., ASBCA No. 6966, 61-2 BCA 3151 (1961).
[Vol. XVI
Comments
literal impossibility of performance was, up until recent years, the only re-
lief recognized in government contracts. 8' In addition, impossibility can be
a situation where economical performance is "not possible within the ob-
jectives contemplated by the parties."82 This latter case relates to what is de-
fined as legal or practical impossibility of performance.
Legal impossibility has gained wide recognition in the general field of
contract law. 3 However, its expansion in the field of government contracts
has been slow. The early holdings of the government have held the contrac-
tor to assumption of the risk by acceptance of a fixed price contract with
performance specifications.8 4 There has been a trend away from this restric-
tive position. Recently, the Court of Claims declared in Natus Corporation
v. United States:
Removed from the structure of the common law, "impossibility" in its modern
context has become a coat of many colors, including among its hues--namely,
impossibility predicated upon commercial impracticality.8 5
The court went on to state that impracticality would result when perform-
ance could only be accomplished at excessive or unreasonable costs. How-
ever, in the instant case the contractor did not recover extra costs because
his failure was due not to factual impossibility but due rather to his inabil-
ity to use the most economical method which would have decreased his profit
margin.
The concept of commercial impracticality, long recognized in the general
contract law,8 6 is now given full effect in cases of contractors seeking claims
for equitable adjustment for excess costs on the grounds of impossibility.
However, its application to the contractor seeking avoidance of liquidated
damages or default is not clear.8 7
Another aspect of legal impossibility is recognized when a "state-of-the-
art" breakthrough is necessary to complete performance under the contract.8 8
In the Appeal of E. L. Cournand and Company, Inc.,8 9 the ASBCA held that
a contractor who needed such a "state-of-the-art" technological break-
through to perform his contract was normally excused. The contractor could
only be held liable if he fell into an exceptional class which clearly assumed
Aerodex, Inc., ASBCA No. 7121, 1962 BCA 3492 (1962).
Appeal of Johnson Elec., Inc., ASBCA No. 6966, 65-1 BCA 4628 (1964).
13 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 454 (1932); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615 (1962).
14 Aerodex, Inc., supra note 81.
11 Natus Corp. v. United States, supra note 74.
16 Supra note 83.
87 Cf. Koppers Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 254-65, January 12, 1967, 11 C.C.F. 80,
879 (1967); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966); commentary
held defense of practical impossibility to be tenuous at best; see 6 GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR
392 (1964).
81 Utah-Manhattan-Sundt, ASBCA No. 8991, 1963 BCA 3854 (1963).
10 ASBCA No. 2955, 60-2 BCA 3840 (1940).
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the risk of impossibility. To be considered in this class, the contractor must
be completely familiar with the risk, and enter into price negotiations with
full knowledge of the "state-of-the-art" and risks inherent in the contem-
plated task. The Board recognized that most contractors will think twice be-
fore they knowingly contract for the risk of impossibility. To ascertain this
allocation, the Board did not lay down any hard and fast rules, but relied
upon the totality of circumstances, i.e., price, delivery time, uniqueness of
design approach, and the circumstances of negotiation.
However, the application of this view has been restricted and confused
by the assumption of the risk doctrine. Essentially, this doctrine holds the
contractor liable despite evidence of impossibility. This concept was ex-
pounded by the Court of Claims in Austin Co. v. United States.0o There the
contractor assumed the risk because he drafted modifications to govern-
ment specifications and this was held sufficient to overcome the impossibility
of development and manufacture of a highly sensitive electronic system. The
ASBCA immediately followed Austin9' and the Comptroller General even
denied relief when the contractor had exceeded the "state-of-the-art."
9 2
Austin did not stop with a restrictive application of the assumption of the
risk doctrine. The court held that even if impossibility existed, the exculpa-
tory language of the default clause, "beyond the control and without the
fault or negligence of the contractor," applied only to the same kind or class
of the particular language that followed "acts of God or the public enemy,
acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires,
floods..., etc." By adherence to the principle of ejusdem generis, the court
effectively read out of the contract any protection to the contractor for in-
herent absolute impossibility of performance. The court held that the words
of the default clause would only give a defense to extraneous or supervening
circumstances. Austin held the contractor to the "square corners" doctrine
and dismissed the appeal on a summary judgment.
Since Austin, the court has expanded the impossibility concept. But it is
uncertain exactly what affect Austin still renders over the impossibility de-
fense. Recently, the Court of Claims upheld the contractor's claim for relief
under similar circumstances. In Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp. v. United States93 the
court relieved the contractor of the assumption of the risk and distinguished
Austin on the grounds that the government drafted the specifications in
question, and therefore, was held to an implied warranty that, if followed, the
specifications would result in a satisfactory product. The case appears to
create two extremities on the issue of liability for assumption of the risk.
91 161 Ct. Cl. 76, 314 F.2d 518, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963).
01 Advance Indus., Inc., ASBCA No. 7402, 1963 BCA 774 (1963); Consolidated Avionics
Corp., ASBCA Nos. 6315 and 6433, 1963 BCA 3888 (1963).
92Decs. Comp. Gen., B-157039 (1966).
91175 Ct. Cl. 518, 360 F.2d 634 (1966).
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On one hand, the Austin doctrine holds the contractor to assumption of the
risk because of his participation in the drafting of the specification. On the
other hand, Hol-Gar would hold the government liable for its participation.
Furthermore, the allocation of the risk9 4 asserted in National Presto Indus.,
Inc. v. United States95 lies somewhere in the middle. In that case the govern-
ment participated in technical discussions, actively promoted the work, and
furnished government equipment for the process. The court held the risk
to be distributed because of the "joint enterprise" nature of the agreement.
Meanwhile, the ASBCA has taken its own course with the application of
the Austin doctrine. In the Appeal of Johnson Elec., Inc.96 a contractor ap-
pealed a termination for default for failure to perform under a fixed price
contract with performance specifications. Instead of directly applying Austin
or earlier rulings, the Board examined all the circumstances and found that
the government's failure to disclose technical information nullified any pre-
sumption of assumed risk. The Board then examined the evidence of im-
possibility.
We can find no fault in the technical competence of the appellant's forces, the
approach it made to solution of its design problems, or its canvassing of sources
of assistance. Its efforts to perform the contract were far in excess of what it
might reasonably have expected from the circumstances existing and made evi-
dent to it at time of bidding of the contract. We think appellant has made out a
case of practical, legal impossibility of performance of the contract.97
Evidently, the Board allowed the fact of the government's superior knowl-
edge to counter-balance the Austin statement that relief from impossibility
will only be granted if it is supervening and not in existence when the con-
tract was executed.
The defense of impossibility in government contracts has developed a
great deal in recent years from its narrow restriction to literal impossibility.
However, uncertainties still exist. It appears that the Court of Claims will
not grant the contractor relief under the default clause unless he can show
evidence of practical impossibility, that it is a supervening clause, and that
he did not assume the risk. On the other hand, a contractor who claims an
equitable adjustment for extra costs on the grounds of impossibility of per-
formance will not be held to the distinction between inherent and superven-
ing impossibility of performance. Because of the restrictive interpretation
given to the default clause, the contractor with the more severe penalty is
denied relief in similar circumstances.
The trend in federal procurement is to shift the risk of performance to
" See Nash, Risk Allocation in Government Contracts, 34 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 693 (1966).
01 167 Ct. C1. 749, 338 F.2d 99 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
01 Supra note 82.
7 Ibid.
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the contractor by means of increased use of the fixed price contract. Also,
systems responsibility is being shifted to the contractor by means of a
device entitled "Total Package Procurement Concept."9 8 Moreover, the
entire area of research and development contracting, which is especially
susceptible to impossibility of performance, is expanding with the same mo-
mentum as our aero-space industries. It appears, therefore, that impossibility
of performance will become a more frequent claim against liquidated dam-
ages and default. However, the tinsel framework of Austin will preclude the
full application of the law of impossibility. The rationale of Natus which ex-
amined the objective reality of nonperformance rather than legal fictions
should be applied to liquidated damages and default using the equitable
approach announced in E. L. Cournand and Johnson Elec.9 9 In addition,
as the default clause is now interpreted, it stands in need of modification
to keep pace with the modem trends in government procurement.
91 See Comment, 6 CCH Gov'T. CONT. REP. 90,042.
9 See Comment, 6 CCH Gov'T. CONT. REP. 90,016.
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